In class we have been considering universalism. Shortly, we will be considering Marilyn McCord Adams' essay "The Problem of Hell: A Problem of Evil for Christians". (We have already touched upon some themes found in her essay.)
Here is one passage from that essay that I'd like you to think carefully about together. In this passage, she notes that all parties to the conversation are "confronted with a theological balancing act". She contrasts her theological balancing act with that of William Lane Craig (along with many other defenders of hell).
Note that in the passage below, '(III)' refers to the proposition that some created persons will be consigned to hell forever while '(I)' refers to the proposition that God exists, and is essentially omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good.
Further note that Adams refers to the following notion of God's goodness to a person:
'God is good to a created person p' if and only if God guarantees to p a life that is a great good to p on the whole, and one in which p's participation in deep and horrendous evils (if any) is defeated within the context of p's life.
She writes:
Like Craig, I take the Bible seriously; indeed, as an Episcopal priest, I am sworn to the claim that "the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments" are "the Word of God" and "contain all things necessary to salvation". Like Swinburne, Stump, and Lewis, I feel bound to weigh the tradition behind (III).... As I see it, both the defenders of hell and I are confronted with a theological balancing act. The prima facie incompossibility of (I) and (III) and the accompanying pragmatic difficulties force us into a position of weighing some items of tradition more than others. Like many Christians, Craig begins with a high doctrine of the authority of Scripture, which combines with a certain hermeneutic, to make (III) obligatory. He then appeals to an equally high doctrine of human freedom to try to reconcile (I) with (III). For this, he pays the price of denying that God will be good to every person he creates...and further of understanding divine goodness to be compatible with the damnation of the vast majority of actual created persons. Likewise, Craig's God shares the limitations of human social planners: (i) He cannot achieve the optimal overall good without sacrificing the welfare of some individual persons; (ii) nor can He redeem all personal evil: some of the wicked He can only quarantine or destroy.
She continues:
By contrast, I emphasize a high doctrine of divine resourcefulness (assigning God the power to let creatures to "do their damnedest" and still win them all over to heavenly bliss) and a low doctrine of human agency (both ontologically, in terms of the gap between God and creatures, and psychologically, in terms of developmental limitations and impairments). Because I do not regard Scripture as infallible on any interpretation, I do not feel bound to translate into theological assertion some of the apocalyptic imagery and plot lines of the New Testament. Nevertheless, I do not regard my universalist theology as un-Scriptural, because I believe the theme of definitive divine triumph is central to the Bible, is exemplified in Christ Jesus, and is the very basis of our Christian hope.
What do you make of her descriptions of the theological balancing acts that she and Craig (and other defenders of hell) must maintain? Are her descriptions accurate? In this passage, at least, she doesn't seem to identify a "price" that she has to "pay" for her theology. Is that because there is no "price" that she must "pay"? If so, why should we think that her theology comes "for free"? But if there is a "price", what is it exactly?
And all this talk about everybody having to confront a theological balancing act might prompt some to suppose that since we all have to do some balancing, we all just get to pick what it is we wish to balance, and there's no genuine rational basis for preferring one balancing act over another. Does that seem right? Why or why not?
Thursday, April 11, 2013
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8 comments:
Adams' balancing act seems to be in having to reject church tradition and, perhaps, infallibility of Scripture. (It seems from previous conversations that one can have a high view of Scripture and still be a universalist.) The church tradition one is more problematic. Traditionally, both (I) and (III) were held simultaneously. That indicates that at least church tradition thought they were compossible, contra Adams. So if Adams thinks they're prima facie incompossible, it seems the most logical explanation is that she has a different understanding of (I), (III), or both than church tradition did. After all, the laws of logic don't seem to have changed, and it seems too bold to assume that we're in a better position to see the incompatibility than some of the greatest minds of the past. Rejecting tradition is a heavy price to pay, but it seems appropriate when there’s good reason to think that the tradition went wrong from sources outside of their theology directly (for example, open theists are very much against the tradition, but they claim that tradition was corrupted by Greek conceptions of God early on). Still, I think rejecting tradition in this instance carries a hefty price, perhaps as much as or more than the price Craig has to pay.
Tommy, I agree that breaking with tradition is a high price to pay. Although I'm not quite sure it is quite as significant as saying that God is not good to every person he creates. This does make me wonder about what the early church fathers believed. Did most of them also affirm an all-things-considered, global conception of the goodness of God?
I think another price that Adams has to pay is that of human freedom, at least understood in a libertarian sense. As we’ve already discussed in class, it seems that the only way to guarantee universal salvation is to affirm that God might possibly have to override the free choices of some of his creatures, choices to decisively reject him. This is why Adams speaks about human agency.
Finally, it’s not clear that there is no genuine rational basis for preferring one balancing act over another. Jut because each view involves some balancing, does not necessitate that each view be equally balanced. Clearly, some theological concerns should be more important than others. So, depending on which concerns we value more highly, it would seem that we could have a basis for preferring one view over another.
--Bayer
In this passage Adams is referring to a theological balancing act between propositions (I) and (III) and the seeming incompatibility of the two. Essentially, she believes that God has the power and the ability to override human freedom in the end. Where I do not affirm universalism, I find this view to be appealing because it fits more accurately with our concept of God. We do not think of God as a being that is confined by “human social planners” but as one with the capability to achieve whatever he intends. I agree with her idea that Gods resourcefulness is not hindered by our humanness, and neither is it dissuaded from any given end. Although she may be straying from the traditional concepts of hell, it seems as if her view captures the purpose of the Bible. So in that regard, there would be little price to pay. But of course this view must be substantiated.
I agree with Tommy, that it certainly is a bold move to assume that she is able to assess the incompossibility between the two claims better than the church fathers, but as to whether it means there will be a price to pay, I am not sure.
~Rachel
Interesting questions. My personal stump on the validity of universalism is the whole bit about tradition. Even if I do come to a different conclusion than the vast majority of church theologians and fathers, how am I justified in saying that I see the key that they missed? To overthrow orthodoxy is bold and can tend to be arrogant. The danger that I see in contradicting church history to affirm universalism is this issue of theology and how many universalists seem to dance around certain passages. Adams does suggest that there needs to be a balance of philosophy and theology, but it would seem that the Church fathers (for the most part) and orthodoxy has leaned more towards the theological side of things because of some passages and traditions that would hold to eternal hell. IN my opinion, this is the safe side of the fence to lean towards. Adams must be willing to say that even though she claims to be balancing, she is leaning the opposite way as orthodoxy when it comes to balancing theology and philosophy. This is a bold move, one that I do not believe wise.
Bayer, from my understanding the church fathers understood God's goodness to be person relative, but they also understood judgment (even eternal judgment) to be an expression of that goodness. They also had a serious understanding of the mystery of God - Tertullian, for instance, claimed God is "especially good, when not good in man's judgment."
As most of you have said, I also agree that the price Adam's is paying is the high price of rejecting Church tradition.
I find it a much better bet to affirm the traditional doctrine of Hell than to adopt the universalist understanding of Hell because if the universalist position is wrong, whether intended or not, some would likely not regard the importance of dying to self and living for Christ and appreciating His sacrifice as deeply as the person who very seriously holds to the traditional doctrine of Hell. While Hell should not be our main motivation for clinging to Christ, considering it is His kindness that leads us to repentance, it still is a reality that the traditional conception of Hell does reveal a depth of seriousness and, whether for good reason or not, some level of motivation to continue to cling to Christ alone as the only deliverance from such an eternal fate. So I would consider it more dangerous than not to assume that eternal Hell does not really exist.
I also agree with Bayer's statement, "just because each view involves some balancing does not necessitate that each view be equally balanced." I think some views could have more potential consequential harm than others and that grants exceptional caution in choosing how to "balance" or "prefer" one view over another.
I agree that Adams is paying an extremely high price in her claim that all will be saved and someday reside in heaven someday. Because I hold to traditional views on hell, when I get to heaven someday only to find out that everyone will eventually get there, I would be relieved and joyful for everyone would then be able to experience the joy of knowing Christ and spending eternity with Him. If I am wrong, there are no negative consequences for me. I still spend eternity in heaven. If Adams is wrong, she spends eternity apart from God burning forever in the lake of fire. I would much rather be safe than sorry.
Her claims seem to be philosophically sound and logical though I must admit. How can a God who is perfectly good and loving chose to create human beings that He knows will someday spend eternity in torment? Wouldn't it be more loving to simply not create humanity in the first place? These questions delve nearly into God's motives for creating us-something I feel we may never fully one-hundred percent be able to comprehend as finite human beings.
-Clay
I think it's true, there does seem to be a sort of "balancing act" that Adams is facing, but I agree with Bayer that just because there is a balancing act does not mean that both sides need to be equally weighed. We have balancing acts in many other areas of our Christian belief as well. When we talked about divine hiddenness, we were confronted with a balancing act between (1) Recognizing God's character as a loving parent who, it would seem, would want to make his love and presence known to his creatures, and (2) Recognizing that God might be infringing upon our personal freedom if he were to make himself clearly known. Many Christians place the value of human freedom above almost anything else. Thus, whenever there is a balancing act that involves human freedom (and, by virtue, personal responsibility), that almost always "wins."
In this specific instance, though, I think Adams shouldn't be too concerned about going against Christian "tradition." It seems to me that adhering to a doctrine that fits better with the redemptive nature of the entire Gospel is more important than Christian "tradition" that results in a denying the goodness of God.
-Kim Small
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