Tuesday, February 5, 2013

van Inwagen on the Argument from Evil

In class this week we are discussing William Rowe's argument from evil to atheism. Here's the argument:

1. There exist horrendous evils that God would have no justifying reason to permit.
2. God would not permit an evil unless he had a justifying reason to permit it.
3. Therefore, God does not exist.

We noted that Rowe thinks that most people--theists and atheists alike--are inclined to affirm premise 2, and so on his view most of the critical attention is devoted to premise 1.

PVI
Peter van Inwagen rejects this argument from evil, but he thinks that premise 1 is "fairly plausible". Instead, he is inclined to reject premise 2. Briefly, his reason is this. (What follows is taken from van Inwagen's "The Problem of Evil" found in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion, 2005.)

He thinks that premise 2 relies upon something like the following moral principle:

(MP) If one is in a position to prevent some evil, one should not allow that evil to occur--not unless allowing it to occur would result in some good that would outweigh it or preventing it would result in some other evil at least as bad.

van Inwagen thinks that MP is false. He thinks that MP is subject to multiple counterexamples. Here's one:

Case 1: You are an official who has the power to release any prisoner at any time. Blodgett is serving a ten year sentence for felonious assault. Near the end of his sentence, he appeals to you to let him out a day early. Should you?

Commentary: According to van Inwagen, MP entails that you should release Blodgett a day early from prison. After all, by releasing Blodgett a day early, you are preventing an evil (another day in prison), and denying Blodgett's appeal and requiring him to stay one more day so as to serve out his entire sentence does not result in some outweighing good (additional crime deterrence or greater balance of justice) or prevent some comparably bad evil.

But, van Inwagen thinks, you have no such duty to grant Blodgett his appeal. MP implies otherwise. So, MP is false.

Case 2: Any welfare state.

Commentary: According to van Inwagen: "In a welfare state, for example, we use taxation to divert money from its primary economic role in order to spend it to prevent or alleviate various social evils. And how much money, what proportion of the gross national product, shall we--that is, the state--divert for this purpose? Well, not none of it and not all of it (enforcing a tax rate of 100 percent on all earned income and all profits would be the same as not having a money economy at all). And where we draw the line is an arbitrary matter. However much we spend on social services, we shall always be able to find some person or family who would be saved from misery if the state spent (in the right way) a mere $1,000 more than it in fact plans to spend. And the state can always find another $1,000 and can find it without damaging the economy or doing any other sort of harm."

In other words, MP seems to imply that any enacted welfare state tax and distribution policy is wrong. After all, in any case, the state is in a position to prevent some evil (the misery of some additional individual or family) and there is no additional outweighing good that is accomplished or some more heinous evil prevented by allowing that evil (the misery of that additional individual or family), but the state allows that evil anyway.

So how does this all apply to evil?

Here's how William Hasker summarizes van Inwagen's reply:

"Van Inwagen contends that in general there is no minimum number of horrors that must be permitted in order to make human beings aware of the evils of their present state. (If n horrors would suffice to accomplish a certain purpose, then n - 1 horrors would accomplish the same purpose.) God cannot prevent all horrors, because that would frustrate his plan for reuniting human beings with himself." 

Now here's the key:

"But wherever God draws the line on the number of horrors permitted, it will be an arbitrary line. In view of this, the moral requirement that God should prevent every horror that does not lead to a greater good is unsound and should be rejected." (http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/25239-the-problem-of-evil/)

Bottom Line: van Inwagen thinks principle MP is false. But, he contends, premise 2 of Rowe's argument relies upon something like MP. So, he concludes, we have good reason to reject premise 2 of Rowe's argument.
 
What do you make of all this? Is van Inwagen right that Rowe's premise 2 relies upon something like MP? Is van Inwagen right that MP is false? What do you make of his objections to MP? Are there other (perhaps better) objections to MP? If so, what are they? 

Interact with each other!