There's a fairly large literature on the matter of divine hiddenness. But here's one theistic response to the issue. Christian philosopher Michael Murray (Franklin and Marshall) offers a free will response to divine hiddenness. In short, he argues that God's existence must remain epistemically ambiguous in order for his creatures to remain significantly free with respect to entering into a relationship with God.
Here's Murray:
"My claim is that the hiddenness of God is required in order for free beings to be able to exercise their freedom in a morally significant manner given the strength of the threat [of eternal hell given disobedience to the divine will] implied by knowledge of the threat implicit in the traditional Christian story. If God revealed his existence in a more perspicuous fashion we would be in a situation very much like the one in the standard robbery case, i.e., strong threat strength and strong threat imminence such that the level of wantonness [i.e., a characteristic of the individual threatened to disregard personal well-being in the face of threats to his freedom] of most, if not all, individuals would not significantly diminish their feeling compelled to act in accordance with the demand of the threatener. However, if God desires that there be individuals with free will who can use it in morally significant ways, then He must decrease the threat imminence of eternal and temporal punishment and He, in fact, does so by making the existence of the threat epistemically ambiguous. It is this epistemic ambiguity that we call the problem of the hiddenness of God."
Consider the merits of Murray's response. (You may have to stew over it a while to understand it.) Is Murray on to something here? Is he right about this? Would Shellenberg have a plausible reply to Murray?
Perhaps Murray's reply does not satisfy. There are other sorts of replies. The following list of responses come from Christian philosophers Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul Moser (from the Introduction to their edited book Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, Cambridge University Press (2002)).
God hides and thus permits reasonable nonbelief...
1. in order to enable people freely to love, trust, and obey Him; otherwise, we would be coerced in a manner incompatible with love. [This seems to be Murray's response.]
2. in order to prevent a human response based on improper motives (such as fear of punishment). [This seems to be a part of Murray's response, too.]
3. because, if He were not hidden, humans would relate to God and to their knowledge of God in presumptuous ways and the possibility of developing the inner attitudes essential to a proper relationship with Him would be ipso facto ruled out.
4. because this hiding prompts us to recognize the wretchedness of life on our own, without God, and thereby stimulates us to search for him contritely and humbly.
5. because if He made His existence clear enough to prevent [reasonable] nonbelief, then the sense of risk required for a passionate faith would be objectionably reduced.
6. because if He made His existence clear enough to prevent [reasonable] nonbelief, temptation to doubt His existence would not be possible, religious diversity would be objectionably reduced, and believers would not have as much opportunity to assist others in starting personal relationships with God.
7. and there's a good reason why God hides, but we don't know what that reason is, and we have no grounds for thinking that we would know what that reason is (since we are finite, cognitively limited people), so there's no basis for an objection to God's existence here.
Maybe one (or the conjunction of two or more) of these explanations succeeds in countering Shellenberg's arguments. Which of these explanations would you offer (if any)? Do you think one (or more) of them succeeds to counter Shellenberg's arguments? If so, which one(s), and what premise (in each argument--Analogy and Conceptual) is denied? If you have a different explanation for divine hiddenness, what is it?
13 comments:
I find Murray's response to be quite convincing; the world is filled with examples of people who only complied with moral law out of fear of reprisal. The importance of morality stemming from the heart rather than external motivation is emphasized often in Scripture.
I am rather inclined to question how effective an answer #7 on the list is, however. Though it certainly can be true that God has a reason for hiddenness unknown to us, it doesn't seem intellectually honest for us to shrug our shoulders and assume there's an answer without at least considering the matter further.
-Alex LaBreche
I think the biggest problem with most all of these responses, and frankly all responses supporting theism, is that they fail to convince anyone that these things are truly a great enough reason for God to allow so many humans to suffer an eternity in Hell. I'm fairly sympathetic to the view expressed by Murray; the response that draws upon the concept of genuine love, genuine relationship, genuine belief as opposed to love and belief spurred by the obviousness of God. I understand that perhaps God would rather humans choose a relationship with Him while his existence is epistemically ambiguous, as opposed to choosing out of fear of eternal damnation (i.e. threatened into a relationship). I can understand that choosing to love God even in His hiddenness might be a "greater good" than loving God with his presence clearly known. However, this fails to take into account the large percentage of humans who die without ever believing in God; those who then enter into an eternity of damnation, separated from God. God, in his omniscience, ought to know which of His creatures will not choose to believe in Him if He keeps his his presence "hidden." If this is the case, if these creatures will not end up believing in an epistemically hidden God, wouldn't God want to do whatever possible to make them believe, even if it is a more "forced" belief? Isn't a somewhat "forced", or "threatened", belief still a greater good than eternal separation?
-Kim Small
It does seem unfair of God to send massive amounts of people to Hell simply because they never believed in Him. That type of action would not fit the description of an all-loving God. And further, because God is all-knowing as well he could easily determine who would have accepted the gospel if He were more apparent and who would still reject him. I was speaking with a friend of mine on this topic, and she comes from a background that believes that in the end, all people are given an equal opportunity to accept Christ during the Final Judgment. She said that all people will come before God and make their final decision. Some will change their minds and believe, but others will still reject him and choose eternal separation. If this were true then it would no longer be the case that God is epistemically hidden. And, in fact in the last day He will sacrifice pure faith based belief in Him so that all people will be given another chance to accept His offer.
That was just one idea though; really I tend to find Murray’s response more persuasive. For us to have a real free choice to love, trust, and obey God, God cannot overt reveal himself. And if He were, then people would instead respond to him out of self preservation purposes rather than interest in a relationship.
Other than that, none of the other responses are very convincing. The final one seems to be a cop out for people who want to stifle thought and dismiss any type of conversation on the topic. An often quoted verse that tends to sufficiently shut down these questions is from Isaiah. It says, “As the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts.” Even, though this verse is obviously true, and we can learn from it, I don’t think it means we are totally unable to know God’s purposes. The ability that he has given us to think and reason is proof enough that he wants us to be curious and continually seek after the truth rather than dismiss it as being to above us to attain.
~Rachel
One major problem with the claim "God's existence must remain epistemically ambiguous in order for his creatures to remain significantly free with respect to entering into a relationship with God" is that there's a significant counterexample: Adam and Eve. God's existence was certainly not epistemically ambiguous to them - they had direct access to God. They also had a strong threat for not maintaining a relationship with God - they'd die if they disobeyed God. Nevertheless, they still maintained their freedom and, in fact, disobeyed God. If the Genesis story is to be believed, then God's hiddenness is a result of sin, not a tool used by God to keep the threat epistemically ambiguous.
There are other counterexamples as well; almost all of us have probably met people who claim that the God of the Bible is such a monster that, if He did exist, they would rather go to hell than go to be with Him. And, in Exodus, God unmasks his hiddenness to Moses, yet He still appears to have a genuine relationship with Moses.
I think that Murry's response is the best support for theism we have read thus far. I have heard many testimonials of Christians that mention things along the lines of undeniable instances where God revealed himself to them which led to a faith that would be irrational to deny. In the same way Murry explains, the more God is present in everyday life, the harder it would be for anyone to decide not to follow or have a relationship with him without disregarding rational decision making. Free will seem to be a whole separate topic of complication to this whole discussion, but as of now I believe Murry has been the most reasonable supported of the theist side of this debate.
Along with this, I thought #7 of the list of replies to Shellenberg-esc arguments is something very important for us to bare in mind. While philosophy is an extremely relevant subject to study and learn from, at the end of the day we have to remember that we are humans. Our minds cannot account for and understand the God's reasoning behind things, to the fullest.
I find it interesting that the selection given from Murray states that God makes “the existence of the threat [of eternal punishment] epistemically ambiguous” in order to allow humans to freely choose to have a relationship with God. Perhaps there is a significant difference between this claim and the claim that “God's existence must remain epistemically ambiguous in order for his creatures to remain significantly free with respect to entering into a relationship with God.” One claim refers to the epistemic ambiguity of God’s existence while the other refers to the epistemic ambiguity of the existence of the threat of eternal punishment. When it comes to Tommy’s example of Adam and Eve, it seems clear that they had no doubt as to the existence of God. However, it might be reasonable to think that they did not fully understand the meaning of God’s warning about death. After all, if they actually understood the meaning of the threat, would they have chosen to act as they did? If the threat was unambiguous, it would have been similar to the robbery case. Perhaps their choice to obey would not have been free in the way that Murray says our relationship with God ought to be. So, it would seem that with the example of Adam and Eve, it is still plausible to maintain that the epistemic ambiguity of the threat of punishment is necessary for human freedom.
--Bayer
As a few of you have said, I also agree that points #1 and #2 are the better points in that list (the ones that closely agree with Murray). A loving relationship cannot exist if it is forced and has fear as it's foundation. If God were to be overbearing and blatant people would "know Him" not out of faith and a heart's desire but without a choice. (Which, I know, stirs up the whole discussion about free will...).
Maybe the "greatest good" is when finite, sinful humans place whatever amount of weak faith they have in God - this God who humbly sought after our love and devotion rather than overtly forcing every human to "submit" to Him.
I don't intend this to be used as a cop out of good dialogue but I have to say that I am okay with admitting that, though I'd like to know more, I don't totally understand God's ways but I am sure that I wouldn't want His ways to be just like mine. I need to be okay with not understanding the infinite and wise mind of God. (Again, I say that in addition to, not in place of, carrying on good conversation).
Tommy, your point is well taken. I think that it makes the most sense to either see divine hiddeness as a result of the fall or choose to take the stance that God just got tired with putting up with humanity and became the God every deist has always thought He was. I have no problem with saying this. Sin has separated us from God.
This argument is very closely linked to the problem of evil argument in my mind. God is certainly able to show Himself on the same level that He is able to stop all evil in the world right now if He wanted to. This may over complicate things, but in my mind, these are both results of the fall. And what is that fall when we really think about it? The fall is just man's rejection of God and what He wanted for them. I heard it said once that sin is not only passed down, but we would actually have eaten from that tree if given the chance as well. I would like to say that I am better than that, but chances are, I would probably choose the tree. The solution then comes from realizing that I have eaten from the tree and turning back to God. The prerequisite for a transformed life is realizing that you are a broken mess and turning to the tree of life, willing to do whatever it costs to be made whole again. This is what Schellenberg never addressed. He never talked about his depravity nor did he talk about his desire to do whatever it cost to have a right relationship with God. He simply wanted to find him for himself. This is not what God is for and Schellenberg can search all of his life, but he will never "find" God if he really doesn't know why he should look for him in the first place.
One who is sick always goes to the doctor after he knows that something is wrong. No one ever goes to the doctor and then finds out that he is sick. The medicine always comes after the diagnosis. The treatment always comes after the realized injury. This is the same with sin. One must realize that this is not the way that it was supposed to be and be willing to give anything and everything to fix the problem. If they aren't willing to give anything and everything, they don't realize how serious the problem is. God is hidden because unbelievers don't know why they are supposed to be looking. - Zach Santmier
Well said, Zach!
I didn’t found any of those points convincing. I agree will Kim, that all those answers are used to defense hebraic theism, take the preposition of hebraic theism. If a person just want something to comfort themselves to avoid the argument of hiddenness of divinity, those answers could work, but as part of a rational debate, those argument are not convincing. Those points share the same ground as the Schellenberg’s opposite argument, that is, some how, God is really in hidden, they all agree that reality is that human beings are hard get response from God in many cases. What about this preposition? Could it wrong? Of cause. In Scripture, Paul indicates that human should realize God’s existence through enough evidence around us, if anyone can not realize God’s existence, it is the individual to take responsibility of failing to know God.
Thomas Kuang
Bayer,
Perhaps so - "death" was ambiguous to them. But if that's the case, couldn't we just ambiguate hell so that people would not understand hell, and then God would be able to appear to them? Would that not be the best course of action for us?
I found #6 to be particularly interesting. "God hides because if He made His existence clear enough to prevent [reasonable] nonbelief, temptation to doubt His existence would not be possible, religious diversity would be objectionably reduced, and believers would not have as much opportunity to assist others in starting personal relationships with God." If God really revealed Himself in such a way that it was completely, beyond a shadow of a doubt obvious that he empirically exists, then why would anyone need to share the gospel? God would have no need to use us as tools to preach the gospel and spread the good news because it is so obvious He already exists! I do not need someone to come up to me and inform me that the sky is blue or that it is raining outside. That information is useless to me. In a similar way, if God made Himself so obvious that we could see Him, the idea of sharing the gospel would prove useless.
Rachel you said, "It does seem unfair of God to send massive amounts of people to Hell simply because they never believed in Him. That type of action would not fit the description of an all-loving God." I agree with that statement, but only to a certain extent. Yes it seems unfair that God would send billions of people to hell, but it is equally unfair for Him to let totally sinful, depraved people like you and me into heaven. I understand where you are going with that point, and I know the person you mentioned that has some interesting views on end times:) but I think it isn't right to overemphasize God's love. God is just as just as He is loving.
You also said "I don’t think it means we are totally unable to know God’s purposes." Again in some ways I agree with this statement, but in others I don't. In many circumstances I think we will never understand what God was doing in our lives when we were going through a particularly tough trial. God is not obligated to inform us of His intentions, and I think it may be somewhat prdeful to assume that our ability to think and reason enables us to know God's purposes. I know you do not mean we can totally know everything God is up to, but those are just my thoughts!
I don't mean to come across as mean or harsh:)
by the way the last comment was by Clay
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