Thursday, January 24, 2013

One Kind of Response to Divine Hiddenness (and a list of others, too)

We've been considering the matter of divine hiddenness in class. In particular, we have been considering Shellenberg's arguments from divine hiddenness to atheism.

There's a fairly large literature on the matter of divine hiddenness. But here's one theistic response to the issue. Christian philosopher Michael Murray (Franklin and Marshall) offers a free will response to divine hiddenness. In short, he argues that God's existence must remain epistemically ambiguous in order for his creatures to remain significantly free with respect to entering into a relationship with God.

Here's Murray:

"My claim is that the hiddenness of God is required in order for free beings to be able to exercise their freedom in a morally significant manner given the strength of the threat [of eternal hell given disobedience to the divine will] implied by knowledge of the threat implicit in the traditional Christian story. If God revealed his existence in a more perspicuous fashion we would be in a situation very much like the one in the standard robbery case, i.e., strong threat strength and strong threat imminence such that the level of wantonness [i.e., a characteristic of the individual threatened to disregard personal well-being in the face of threats to his freedom] of most, if not all, individuals would not significantly diminish their feeling compelled to act in accordance with the demand of the threatener. However, if God desires that there be individuals with free will who can use it in morally significant ways, then He must decrease the threat imminence of eternal and temporal punishment and He, in fact, does so by making the existence of the threat epistemically ambiguous. It is this epistemic ambiguity that we call the problem of the hiddenness of God."

Consider the merits of Murray's response. (You may have to stew over it a while to understand it.) Is Murray on to something here? Is he right about this? Would Shellenberg have a plausible reply to Murray?

Perhaps Murray's reply does not satisfy. There are other sorts of replies. The following list of responses come from Christian philosophers Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul Moser (from the Introduction to their edited book Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, Cambridge University Press (2002)).
God hides and thus permits reasonable nonbelief...

1. in order to enable people freely to love, trust, and obey Him; otherwise, we would be coerced in a manner incompatible with love. [This seems to be Murray's response.]
2. in order to prevent a human response based on improper motives (such as fear of punishment). [This seems to be a part of Murray's response, too.]
3. because, if He were not hidden, humans would relate to God and to their knowledge of God in presumptuous ways and the possibility of developing the inner attitudes essential to a proper relationship with Him would be ipso facto ruled out.
4. because this hiding prompts us to recognize the wretchedness of life on our own, without God, and thereby stimulates us to search for him contritely and humbly.
5. because if He made His existence clear enough to prevent [reasonable] nonbelief, then the sense of risk required for a passionate faith would be objectionably reduced.
6. because if He made His existence clear enough to prevent [reasonable] nonbelief, temptation to doubt His existence would not be possible, religious diversity would be objectionably reduced, and believers would not have as much opportunity to assist others in starting personal relationships with God.
7. and there's a good reason why God hides, but we don't know what that reason is, and we have no grounds for thinking that we would know what that reason is (since we are finite, cognitively limited people), so there's no basis for an objection to God's existence here.
Maybe one (or the conjunction of two or more) of these explanations succeeds in countering Shellenberg's arguments. Which of these explanations would you offer (if any)? Do you think one (or more) of them succeeds to counter Shellenberg's arguments? If so, which one(s), and what premise (in each argument--Analogy and Conceptual) is denied? If you have a different explanation for divine hiddenness, what is it?

Be sure to interact with each other. Again, take advantage of these opportunities to have these directed, focused conversations.

Tuesday, January 15, 2013

Divine Hiddenness and the Analogy Argument.

In class we have been discussing Shellenberg's Analogy Argument. Here's a reconstruction of that argument:

The Analogy Argument
1.  A loving mother would not be hidden from her child in circumstances like those mentioned if she could help it because:
(a) A loving mother would consider each of her child’s serious requests important and seek      to provide a quick response.
(b) A loving mother would wish to spare her child needless trauma, or, more positively, woud wish to foster her child’s physical and emotional well-being.
(c) A loving mother would seek to avoid encouraging in her child false or misleading thoughts about herself or about their relationship.
(d) A loving mother would want personal interaction with her child whenever possible, for the joy it brings as well as for its own sake.
(e) A loving mother would miss her child if separated from her.
2. In the actual world, there are circumstances involving God/seeker very similar to those mentioned in the mother/child stories.
3. God would not be hidden from any of God’s children (i.e., all human beings) in circumstances like those mentioned if God could help it because:
(a) God would consider each serious request submitted by any of God’s human children important and seek to provide a quick response.
(b) God would wish to spare all human beings needless trauma, or, more positively, woud wish to foster their physical and emotional well-being.
(c) God would seek not to encourage in any human being false or misleading thoughts about God or about the divine-human relationship.
(d) God would want personal interaction with all human beings whenever possible, for the joy it brings as well as for its own sake.
(e) God would miss such personal interaction if it were absent.
4. God is hidden from many human beings.
5. If (1)-(4), then either God does not exist or God can’t help but be hidden.
6. Therefore, either God does not exist or God can’t help but be hidden. (1-5)
7. But God can help but be hidden.
8. Therefore, God does not exist. (6, 7)

Shellenberg entertains a number of objections to this argument. He replies to those objections. Which of these objections do you think is most compelling? What do you make of his reply (or replies) to that objection? Are there better objections to The Analogy Argument that Shellenberg doesn't consider? What are they? How might he reply?

Enjoy a good, rigorous discussion of this argument. Be sure to interact with each other.

Monday, January 7, 2013

Welcome!

This is the course blog for Philosophy of Religion.

My hope is that each of you will participate thoughtfully and graciously in the conversations on this blog. The topics addressed in this course are crucial to our shared Christian commitments. Consequently, we may be unwilling to consider carefully and charitably views that are different from our own or to take seriously objections to our beliefs.

This is unfortunate and tragic.

I should hope that on this blog we practice listening carefully to each other, expressing clearly and carefully our positions, and handling graciously criticisms raised against our beliefs. Doing so should help us all think harder and better about who God is and how God interacts with the world, and who we are and how we are to interact with the world.

I look forward to joining in conversation with each of you!