In class we have been considering universalism. Shortly, we will be considering Marilyn McCord Adams' essay "The Problem of Hell: A Problem of Evil for Christians". (We have already touched upon some themes found in her essay.)
Here is one passage from that essay that I'd like you to think carefully about together. In this passage, she notes that all parties to the conversation are "confronted with a theological balancing act". She contrasts her theological balancing act with that of William Lane Craig (along with many other defenders of hell).
Note that in the passage below, '(III)' refers to the proposition that some created persons will be consigned to hell forever while '(I)' refers to the proposition that God exists, and is essentially omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good.
Further note that Adams refers to the following notion of God's goodness to a person:
'God is good to a created person p' if and only if God guarantees to p a life that is a great good to p on the whole, and one in which p's participation in deep and horrendous evils (if any) is defeated within the context of p's life.
She writes:
Like Craig, I take the Bible seriously; indeed, as an Episcopal priest, I am sworn to the claim that "the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments" are "the Word of God" and "contain all things necessary to salvation". Like Swinburne, Stump, and Lewis, I feel bound to weigh the tradition behind (III).... As I see it, both the defenders of hell and I are confronted with a theological balancing act. The prima facie incompossibility of (I) and (III) and the accompanying pragmatic difficulties force us into a position of weighing some items of tradition more than others. Like many Christians, Craig begins with a high doctrine of the authority of Scripture, which combines with a certain hermeneutic, to make (III) obligatory. He then appeals to an equally high doctrine of human freedom to try to reconcile (I) with (III). For this, he pays the price of denying that God will be good to every person he creates...and further of understanding divine goodness to be compatible with the damnation of the vast majority of actual created persons. Likewise, Craig's God shares the limitations of human social planners: (i) He cannot achieve the optimal overall good without sacrificing the welfare of some individual persons; (ii) nor can He redeem all personal evil: some of the wicked He can only quarantine or destroy.
She continues:
By contrast, I emphasize a high doctrine of divine resourcefulness (assigning God the power to let creatures to "do their damnedest" and still win them all over to heavenly bliss) and a low doctrine of human agency (both ontologically, in terms of the gap between God and creatures, and psychologically, in terms of developmental limitations and impairments). Because I do not regard Scripture as infallible on any interpretation, I do not feel bound to translate into theological assertion some of the apocalyptic imagery and plot lines of the New Testament. Nevertheless, I do not regard my universalist theology as un-Scriptural, because I believe the theme of definitive divine triumph is central to the Bible, is exemplified in Christ Jesus, and is the very basis of our Christian hope.
What do you make of her descriptions of the theological balancing acts that she and Craig (and other defenders of hell) must maintain? Are her descriptions accurate? In this passage, at least, she doesn't seem to identify a "price" that she has to "pay" for her theology. Is that because there is no "price" that she must "pay"? If so, why should we think that her theology comes "for free"? But if there is a "price", what is it exactly?
And all this talk about everybody having to confront a theological balancing act might prompt some to suppose that since we all have to do some balancing, we all just get to pick what it is we wish to balance, and there's no genuine rational basis for preferring one balancing act over another. Does that seem right? Why or why not?
Thursday, April 11, 2013
Thursday, March 21, 2013
Keith DeRose on Universalism
Coments due: 11:59pm Tuesday, March 26, 2013
Perhaps some of you have seen this previously. (It's been up even since I was in grad school.) Here is a link to an essay entitled "Universalism and the Bible" by Keith DeRose (a Christian philosopher at Yale who, incidentally, did his undergraduate studies at Calvin College).
http://pantheon.yale.edu/~kd47/univ.htm
Give the essay a close read. Jot some things down while you read. Take notes. Pause to reflect. And then respond here. Did DeRose make some compelling points? If so, what are they? Where, if anywhere, did his case seem weakest? What are the objections you might press? Does he have any good replies to those objections available to him? How do DeRose's views fit into the Walls/Talbott exchange?
Be sure to interact with each other! Take advantage of this good opportunity to engage in sustained critical reflection with others. Press each other. Don't be satisfied with mere assertions.
 |
| Keith DeRose |
http://pantheon.yale.edu/~kd47/univ.htm
Give the essay a close read. Jot some things down while you read. Take notes. Pause to reflect. And then respond here. Did DeRose make some compelling points? If so, what are they? Where, if anywhere, did his case seem weakest? What are the objections you might press? Does he have any good replies to those objections available to him? How do DeRose's views fit into the Walls/Talbott exchange?
Be sure to interact with each other! Take advantage of this good opportunity to engage in sustained critical reflection with others. Press each other. Don't be satisfied with mere assertions.
Thursday, March 14, 2013
No Way, No How, No Hell?
Comments Due: 11:59pm March 19, 2013.
Stephen T. Davis (Claremont McKenna College) considers the following to be one of the five best arguments for universalism that he can think of:
"How can the Blessed experience joy in heaven if friends and loved ones are in hell? Obviously (so universalists will argue), they can't. People can only know joy and happiness in heaven if everyone else is or eventually will be there too. If the Blessed are to experience joy in heaven, as Christian tradition says they are, universalism must be true."
(Note that Talbott seems to offer a similar line of reasoning in the essay you have read. He also more explicitly offers that reasoning here: http://www.willamette.edu/~ttalbott/basic.shtml.)
Now, Davis is no universalist. But regarding the above line of reasoning he writes:
"How can the Blessed be joyous if friends and loved ones are in hell? I do not know an adequate answer to this question. I expect that if I knew enough about heaven I would know the answer, but I know little about heaven. The problem is perhaps less acute for me than for those seperationists who believe hell is a place of permanent torture. If I am right, the Blessed need not worry that loved ones are in agony and are allowed to hope that God's love can even yet achieve a reconciliation. But there is still the question how, say, a wife can experience joy and happiness in heaven while her beloved husband is in hell. And that is the question I am unable to answer satisfactorily. It would seem to be unjust for God to allow the wrong choices of the damned--i.e., their rejection of God--to ruin the joy of the Blessed, who have chosen to love God. But how God brings it about that the Blessed experience the joy of the presence of God despite the absence of others, I do not know."
How might you respond to this particular universalist line of reasoning? Do you find it compelling? If so, why? If not, can you do better than Davis here? Consider what others say and be sure to respond to each other.
Stephen T. Davis (Claremont McKenna College) considers the following to be one of the five best arguments for universalism that he can think of:
"How can the Blessed experience joy in heaven if friends and loved ones are in hell? Obviously (so universalists will argue), they can't. People can only know joy and happiness in heaven if everyone else is or eventually will be there too. If the Blessed are to experience joy in heaven, as Christian tradition says they are, universalism must be true."
(Note that Talbott seems to offer a similar line of reasoning in the essay you have read. He also more explicitly offers that reasoning here: http://www.willamette.edu/~ttalbott/basic.shtml.)
Now, Davis is no universalist. But regarding the above line of reasoning he writes:
"How can the Blessed be joyous if friends and loved ones are in hell? I do not know an adequate answer to this question. I expect that if I knew enough about heaven I would know the answer, but I know little about heaven. The problem is perhaps less acute for me than for those seperationists who believe hell is a place of permanent torture. If I am right, the Blessed need not worry that loved ones are in agony and are allowed to hope that God's love can even yet achieve a reconciliation. But there is still the question how, say, a wife can experience joy and happiness in heaven while her beloved husband is in hell. And that is the question I am unable to answer satisfactorily. It would seem to be unjust for God to allow the wrong choices of the damned--i.e., their rejection of God--to ruin the joy of the Blessed, who have chosen to love God. But how God brings it about that the Blessed experience the joy of the presence of God despite the absence of others, I do not know."
How might you respond to this particular universalist line of reasoning? Do you find it compelling? If so, why? If not, can you do better than Davis here? Consider what others say and be sure to respond to each other.
Tuesday, February 5, 2013
van Inwagen on the Argument from Evil
In class this week we are discussing William Rowe's argument from evil to atheism. Here's the argument:
1. There exist horrendous evils that God would have no justifying reason to permit.
2. God would not permit an evil unless he had a justifying reason to permit it.
3. Therefore, God does not exist.
We noted that Rowe thinks that most people--theists and atheists alike--are inclined to affirm premise 2, and so on his view most of the critical attention is devoted to premise 1.
Peter van Inwagen rejects this argument from evil, but he thinks that premise 1 is "fairly plausible". Instead, he is inclined to reject premise 2. Briefly, his reason is this. (What follows is taken from van Inwagen's "The Problem of Evil" found in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion, 2005.)
He thinks that premise 2 relies upon something like the following moral principle:
(MP) If one is in a position to prevent some evil, one should not allow that evil to occur--not unless allowing it to occur would result in some good that would outweigh it or preventing it would result in some other evil at least as bad.
van Inwagen thinks that MP is false. He thinks that MP is subject to multiple counterexamples. Here's one:
Case 1: You are an official who has the power to release any prisoner at any time. Blodgett is serving a ten year sentence for felonious assault. Near the end of his sentence, he appeals to you to let him out a day early. Should you?
Commentary: According to van Inwagen, MP entails that you should release Blodgett a day early from prison. After all, by releasing Blodgett a day early, you are preventing an evil (another day in prison), and denying Blodgett's appeal and requiring him to stay one more day so as to serve out his entire sentence does not result in some outweighing good (additional crime deterrence or greater balance of justice) or prevent some comparably bad evil.
But, van Inwagen thinks, you have no such duty to grant Blodgett his appeal. MP implies otherwise. So, MP is false.
Case 2: Any welfare state.
Commentary: According to van Inwagen: "In a welfare state, for example, we use taxation to divert money from its primary economic role in order to spend it to prevent or alleviate various social evils. And how much money, what proportion of the gross national product, shall we--that is, the state--divert for this purpose? Well, not none of it and not all of it (enforcing a tax rate of 100 percent on all earned income and all profits would be the same as not having a money economy at all). And where we draw the line is an arbitrary matter. However much we spend on social services, we shall always be able to find some person or family who would be saved from misery if the state spent (in the right way) a mere $1,000 more than it in fact plans to spend. And the state can always find another $1,000 and can find it without damaging the economy or doing any other sort of harm."
In other words, MP seems to imply that any enacted welfare state tax and distribution policy is wrong. After all, in any case, the state is in a position to prevent some evil (the misery of some additional individual or family) and there is no additional outweighing good that is accomplished or some more heinous evil prevented by allowing that evil (the misery of that additional individual or family), but the state allows that evil anyway.
So how does this all apply to evil?
Here's how William Hasker summarizes van Inwagen's reply:
"Van Inwagen contends that in general there is no minimum number of horrors that must be permitted in order to make human beings aware of the evils of their present state. (If n horrors would suffice to accomplish a certain purpose, then n - 1 horrors would accomplish the same purpose.) God cannot prevent all horrors, because that would frustrate his plan for reuniting human beings with himself."
Now here's the key:
"But wherever God draws the line on the number of horrors permitted, it will be an arbitrary line. In view of this, the moral requirement that God should prevent every horror that does not lead to a greater good is unsound and should be rejected." (http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/25239-the-problem-of-evil/)
Bottom Line: van Inwagen thinks principle MP is false. But, he contends, premise 2 of Rowe's argument relies upon something like MP. So, he concludes, we have good reason to reject premise 2 of Rowe's argument.
What do you make of all this? Is van Inwagen right that Rowe's premise 2 relies upon something like MP? Is van Inwagen right that MP is false? What do you make of his objections to MP? Are there other (perhaps better) objections to MP? If so, what are they?
Interact with each other!
1. There exist horrendous evils that God would have no justifying reason to permit.
2. God would not permit an evil unless he had a justifying reason to permit it.
3. Therefore, God does not exist.
We noted that Rowe thinks that most people--theists and atheists alike--are inclined to affirm premise 2, and so on his view most of the critical attention is devoted to premise 1.
 |
| PVI |
He thinks that premise 2 relies upon something like the following moral principle:
(MP) If one is in a position to prevent some evil, one should not allow that evil to occur--not unless allowing it to occur would result in some good that would outweigh it or preventing it would result in some other evil at least as bad.
van Inwagen thinks that MP is false. He thinks that MP is subject to multiple counterexamples. Here's one:
Case 1: You are an official who has the power to release any prisoner at any time. Blodgett is serving a ten year sentence for felonious assault. Near the end of his sentence, he appeals to you to let him out a day early. Should you?
Commentary: According to van Inwagen, MP entails that you should release Blodgett a day early from prison. After all, by releasing Blodgett a day early, you are preventing an evil (another day in prison), and denying Blodgett's appeal and requiring him to stay one more day so as to serve out his entire sentence does not result in some outweighing good (additional crime deterrence or greater balance of justice) or prevent some comparably bad evil.
But, van Inwagen thinks, you have no such duty to grant Blodgett his appeal. MP implies otherwise. So, MP is false.
Case 2: Any welfare state.
Commentary: According to van Inwagen: "In a welfare state, for example, we use taxation to divert money from its primary economic role in order to spend it to prevent or alleviate various social evils. And how much money, what proportion of the gross national product, shall we--that is, the state--divert for this purpose? Well, not none of it and not all of it (enforcing a tax rate of 100 percent on all earned income and all profits would be the same as not having a money economy at all). And where we draw the line is an arbitrary matter. However much we spend on social services, we shall always be able to find some person or family who would be saved from misery if the state spent (in the right way) a mere $1,000 more than it in fact plans to spend. And the state can always find another $1,000 and can find it without damaging the economy or doing any other sort of harm."
In other words, MP seems to imply that any enacted welfare state tax and distribution policy is wrong. After all, in any case, the state is in a position to prevent some evil (the misery of some additional individual or family) and there is no additional outweighing good that is accomplished or some more heinous evil prevented by allowing that evil (the misery of that additional individual or family), but the state allows that evil anyway.
So how does this all apply to evil?
Here's how William Hasker summarizes van Inwagen's reply:
"Van Inwagen contends that in general there is no minimum number of horrors that must be permitted in order to make human beings aware of the evils of their present state. (If n horrors would suffice to accomplish a certain purpose, then n - 1 horrors would accomplish the same purpose.) God cannot prevent all horrors, because that would frustrate his plan for reuniting human beings with himself."
Now here's the key:
"But wherever God draws the line on the number of horrors permitted, it will be an arbitrary line. In view of this, the moral requirement that God should prevent every horror that does not lead to a greater good is unsound and should be rejected." (http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/25239-the-problem-of-evil/)
Bottom Line: van Inwagen thinks principle MP is false. But, he contends, premise 2 of Rowe's argument relies upon something like MP. So, he concludes, we have good reason to reject premise 2 of Rowe's argument.
What do you make of all this? Is van Inwagen right that Rowe's premise 2 relies upon something like MP? Is van Inwagen right that MP is false? What do you make of his objections to MP? Are there other (perhaps better) objections to MP? If so, what are they?
Interact with each other!
Thursday, January 24, 2013
One Kind of Response to Divine Hiddenness (and a list of others, too)
We've been considering the matter of divine hiddenness in class. In particular, we have been considering Shellenberg's arguments from divine hiddenness to atheism.
There's a fairly large literature on the matter of divine hiddenness. But here's one theistic response to the issue. Christian philosopher Michael Murray (Franklin and Marshall) offers a free will response to divine hiddenness. In short, he argues that God's existence must remain epistemically ambiguous in order for his creatures to remain significantly free with respect to entering into a relationship with God.
Here's Murray:
"My claim is that the hiddenness of God is required in order for free beings to be able to exercise their freedom in a morally significant manner given the strength of the threat [of eternal hell given disobedience to the divine will] implied by knowledge of the threat implicit in the traditional Christian story. If God revealed his existence in a more perspicuous fashion we would be in a situation very much like the one in the standard robbery case, i.e., strong threat strength and strong threat imminence such that the level of wantonness [i.e., a characteristic of the individual threatened to disregard personal well-being in the face of threats to his freedom] of most, if not all, individuals would not significantly diminish their feeling compelled to act in accordance with the demand of the threatener. However, if God desires that there be individuals with free will who can use it in morally significant ways, then He must decrease the threat imminence of eternal and temporal punishment and He, in fact, does so by making the existence of the threat epistemically ambiguous. It is this epistemic ambiguity that we call the problem of the hiddenness of God."
Consider the merits of Murray's response. (You may have to stew over it a while to understand it.) Is Murray on to something here? Is he right about this? Would Shellenberg have a plausible reply to Murray?
Perhaps Murray's reply does not satisfy. There are other sorts of replies. The following list of responses come from Christian philosophers Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul Moser (from the Introduction to their edited book Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, Cambridge University Press (2002)).
1. in order to enable people freely to love, trust, and obey Him; otherwise, we would be coerced in a manner incompatible with love. [This seems to be Murray's response.]
Be sure to interact with each other. Again, take advantage of these opportunities to have these directed, focused conversations.
There's a fairly large literature on the matter of divine hiddenness. But here's one theistic response to the issue. Christian philosopher Michael Murray (Franklin and Marshall) offers a free will response to divine hiddenness. In short, he argues that God's existence must remain epistemically ambiguous in order for his creatures to remain significantly free with respect to entering into a relationship with God.
Here's Murray:
"My claim is that the hiddenness of God is required in order for free beings to be able to exercise their freedom in a morally significant manner given the strength of the threat [of eternal hell given disobedience to the divine will] implied by knowledge of the threat implicit in the traditional Christian story. If God revealed his existence in a more perspicuous fashion we would be in a situation very much like the one in the standard robbery case, i.e., strong threat strength and strong threat imminence such that the level of wantonness [i.e., a characteristic of the individual threatened to disregard personal well-being in the face of threats to his freedom] of most, if not all, individuals would not significantly diminish their feeling compelled to act in accordance with the demand of the threatener. However, if God desires that there be individuals with free will who can use it in morally significant ways, then He must decrease the threat imminence of eternal and temporal punishment and He, in fact, does so by making the existence of the threat epistemically ambiguous. It is this epistemic ambiguity that we call the problem of the hiddenness of God."
Consider the merits of Murray's response. (You may have to stew over it a while to understand it.) Is Murray on to something here? Is he right about this? Would Shellenberg have a plausible reply to Murray?
Perhaps Murray's reply does not satisfy. There are other sorts of replies. The following list of responses come from Christian philosophers Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul Moser (from the Introduction to their edited book Divine Hiddenness: New Essays, Cambridge University Press (2002)).
God hides and thus permits reasonable nonbelief...
1. in order to enable people freely to love, trust, and obey Him; otherwise, we would be coerced in a manner incompatible with love. [This seems to be Murray's response.]
2. in order to prevent a human response based on improper motives (such as fear of punishment). [This seems to be a part of Murray's response, too.]
3. because, if He were not hidden, humans would relate to God and to their knowledge of God in presumptuous ways and the possibility of developing the inner attitudes essential to a proper relationship with Him would be ipso facto ruled out.
4. because this hiding prompts us to recognize the wretchedness of life on our own, without God, and thereby stimulates us to search for him contritely and humbly.
5. because if He made His existence clear enough to prevent [reasonable] nonbelief, then the sense of risk required for a passionate faith would be objectionably reduced.
6. because if He made His existence clear enough to prevent [reasonable] nonbelief, temptation to doubt His existence would not be possible, religious diversity would be objectionably reduced, and believers would not have as much opportunity to assist others in starting personal relationships with God.
7. and there's a good reason why God hides, but we don't know what that reason is, and we have no grounds for thinking that we would know what that reason is (since we are finite, cognitively limited people), so there's no basis for an objection to God's existence here.
Maybe one (or the conjunction of two or more) of these explanations succeeds in countering Shellenberg's arguments. Which of these explanations would you offer (if any)? Do you think one (or more) of them succeeds to counter Shellenberg's arguments? If so, which one(s), and what premise (in each argument--Analogy and Conceptual) is denied? If you have a different explanation for divine hiddenness, what is it?
Tuesday, January 15, 2013
Divine Hiddenness and the Analogy Argument.
In class we have been discussing Shellenberg's Analogy Argument. Here's a reconstruction of that argument:
(a) A loving mother would consider each of her child’s serious requests important and seek to provide a quick response.
(b) A loving mother would wish to spare her child needless trauma, or, more positively, woud wish to foster her child’s physical and emotional well-being.
(c) A loving mother would seek to avoid encouraging in her child false or misleading thoughts about herself or about their relationship.
(d) A loving mother would want personal interaction with her child whenever possible, for the joy it brings as well as for its own sake.
(e) A loving mother would miss her child if separated from her.
2. In the actual world, there are circumstances involving God/seeker very similar to those mentioned in the mother/child stories.
3. God would not be hidden from any of God’s children (i.e., all human beings) in circumstances like those mentioned if God could help it because:
(a) God would consider each serious request submitted by any of God’s human children important and seek to provide a quick response.
(b) God would wish to spare all human beings needless trauma, or, more positively, woud wish to foster their physical and emotional well-being.
(c) God would seek not to encourage in any human being false or misleading thoughts about God or about the divine-human relationship.
(d) God would want personal interaction with all human beings whenever possible, for the joy it brings as well as for its own sake.
(e) God would miss such personal interaction if it were absent.
4. God is hidden from many human beings.
5. If (1)-(4), then either God does not exist or God can’t help but be hidden.
6. Therefore, either God does not exist or God can’t help but be hidden. (1-5)
7. But God can help but be hidden.
8. Therefore, God does not exist. (6, 7)
Shellenberg entertains a number of objections to this argument. He replies to those objections. Which of these objections do you think is most compelling? What do you make of his reply (or replies) to that objection? Are there better objections to The Analogy Argument that Shellenberg doesn't consider? What are they? How might he reply?
Enjoy a good, rigorous discussion of this argument. Be sure to interact with each other.
The
Analogy Argument
1.
A
loving mother would not be hidden from her child in circumstances like those
mentioned if she could help it because: (a) A loving mother would consider each of her child’s serious requests important and seek to provide a quick response.
(b) A loving mother would wish to spare her child needless trauma, or, more positively, woud wish to foster her child’s physical and emotional well-being.
(c) A loving mother would seek to avoid encouraging in her child false or misleading thoughts about herself or about their relationship.
(d) A loving mother would want personal interaction with her child whenever possible, for the joy it brings as well as for its own sake.
(e) A loving mother would miss her child if separated from her.
2. In the actual world, there are circumstances involving God/seeker very similar to those mentioned in the mother/child stories.
3. God would not be hidden from any of God’s children (i.e., all human beings) in circumstances like those mentioned if God could help it because:
(a) God would consider each serious request submitted by any of God’s human children important and seek to provide a quick response.
(b) God would wish to spare all human beings needless trauma, or, more positively, woud wish to foster their physical and emotional well-being.
(c) God would seek not to encourage in any human being false or misleading thoughts about God or about the divine-human relationship.
(d) God would want personal interaction with all human beings whenever possible, for the joy it brings as well as for its own sake.
(e) God would miss such personal interaction if it were absent.
4. God is hidden from many human beings.
5. If (1)-(4), then either God does not exist or God can’t help but be hidden.
6. Therefore, either God does not exist or God can’t help but be hidden. (1-5)
7. But God can help but be hidden.
8. Therefore, God does not exist. (6, 7)
Shellenberg entertains a number of objections to this argument. He replies to those objections. Which of these objections do you think is most compelling? What do you make of his reply (or replies) to that objection? Are there better objections to The Analogy Argument that Shellenberg doesn't consider? What are they? How might he reply?
Enjoy a good, rigorous discussion of this argument. Be sure to interact with each other.
Monday, January 7, 2013
Welcome!
This is the course blog for Philosophy of Religion.
My hope is that each of you will participate thoughtfully and graciously in the conversations on this blog. The topics addressed in this course are crucial to our shared Christian commitments. Consequently, we may be unwilling to consider carefully and charitably views that are different from our own or to take seriously objections to our beliefs.
This is unfortunate and tragic.
I should hope that on this blog we practice listening carefully to each other, expressing clearly and carefully our positions, and handling graciously criticisms raised against our beliefs. Doing so should help us all think harder and better about who God is and how God interacts with the world, and who we are and how we are to interact with the world.
I look forward to joining in conversation with each of you!
My hope is that each of you will participate thoughtfully and graciously in the conversations on this blog. The topics addressed in this course are crucial to our shared Christian commitments. Consequently, we may be unwilling to consider carefully and charitably views that are different from our own or to take seriously objections to our beliefs.
This is unfortunate and tragic.
I should hope that on this blog we practice listening carefully to each other, expressing clearly and carefully our positions, and handling graciously criticisms raised against our beliefs. Doing so should help us all think harder and better about who God is and how God interacts with the world, and who we are and how we are to interact with the world.
I look forward to joining in conversation with each of you!
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